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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GLEN F. NIELSEN and ALTAR.
NIELSEN, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents

Case No.

vs.

8817

W. R. RUCKER and ADDIE W.
RUCKER, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although the respondents do not seriously disagree
with the statement of facts set out in the appellants' brief
they believe it to be inadequate to illustrate the background
of the issues in this case. Appellants reluctance to refer
to a record that does not support their contentions is understandable. Respondents, therefore, will relate the facts in
more complete detail.
Prior to the 14th of March, 1957, the respondents owned a dairy farm located approximately three miles north of
Brigham City, Utah. This farm, together with 77 head of
dairy stock and equipment thereon, had been listed with
the Real Estate Exchange of Ogden, Utah. At the same
time Mr. Rucker and his wife were the owners of a 24-unit
motel, a home and an apartment house in Tremonton,
Utah, and at that time had listed this property with the
1
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Chapman Realty Company, which company was a member
of the multiple listing agreement group. (Tr .25-26) Negotiations for a trade of this property for the dairy farm
owned by respondents commenced in the month of March,
1957, and Mr. Rucker looked over the respondents' property (Tr. 27).
On the 14th day of March, 1957, appellants and respondents acting through the said Real Estate Exchange represented by a Mr. Petersen and Mr. Cheney, agents who acted
for both parties, made, signed and delivered, each to the
other, the original contract (Plaintiffs' Ex. A) upon which
the respondents are now seeking a decree of specific performance from the court, (Tr. 29, 32 & 35). This is designated as an earnest money receipt and offer to purchase.
Under the terms of this contract it was agreed, that
the appellants would exchange their 24-unit motel, one home,
one apartment house located in Tremonton, Utah, together
with all fixtures and equipment, all linens, bedspreads,
blankets and all pertaining to the motel, apartment house
and home, for the dairy farm together with all stock and
equipment owned by the respondents as more particularly
set out and listed on a listing card (Ex. X) all located three
miles north of Brigham City, Utah. Each of the above
properties was valued at $95,000,00. The respondents'
property was encumbered by a $29,000.00 obligation and the
appellants' property had a $19,000.00 mortgage on it. The
difference of $10,000.00 was erased by an agreement between the parties, that plaintiffs would sign an agreement
to pay the defendants an additional $10,000.00 as stated in
the original contract (Ex. A).
This original contract for the exchange of the property
owned by the parties provides that the date of possession
of. the property by the respective parties be on or before
April 5th, 1957.
All of the parties concerned with this transaction testi2
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fied consistently as to several inspections and viewings of
the premises and as to their complete knowledge of the
properties prior to the signing of the instrument. Mr.
Rucker testified that prior to the signing of the first agreement he had visited the Nielsen property and "I went over
the cattle" (Tr.28); and he admitted that he knew that there
was a chattel mortgage on the cattle (Tr. 38). He further
testified that he counted the cows and was satisfied (Tr.
198). Robert W. Rucker, son of the appellants, testified
that prior to the time the original agreement was signed
they went over to the Nielsen place and Mr. Nielsen showed
them the lines of the place-the way it laid (Tr.291). Also,
Max W. Rucker, another son of the appellants testified regarding the negotiations and explained the examination of
the Nielsen property by his parents (Tr. 312-319). He also
stated that his parents started packing things preparatory
to moving after March 30th and that his father said that
if everything went right he was figuring on moving (Tr.
320).
The respondent, Mr. Nielsen, testifed (Tr. 154) that he
and Mr. Rucker had counted the cattle together, and when
the latter was shown about the property he stated that he
was acquainted with the land. Mr. Cheney, the agent, testified that he had counted the far.m machinery and the cattle
with Mr. Rucker and his sons (Tr. 102).
Tacit acknowledgment of the existence of the agreement was further given by appellants when, some two weeks
after it was signed, they sought to implement the original
contract by entering into an agreement "to supplement
part" of it. Had no original contract been in effect there
would be nothing to supplement. The evidence at the trial
reveals that subsequent to the signing of the original agreement the respondents were experiencing difficulty in raising the necessary financing to carry out their part of the
agreement and Mr. Rucker, the appellent, sought to assist
them in this situation by proposing that the original agree3
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ment be supplemented in order to expedite the performance
of the agreement according to its terms. Mr. Rucker testified that he approached the agent, Mr. Petersen, himself
and proposed the supplemental agreement as a method for
carrying out the trade (Tr. 39-40), and that by doing so
he agreed to do some of the financing himself and take a
second mortgage on part of the property that Mr. Nielsen
was going to receive in the trade.
The record is clear, convincing and undisputed that the
supplemental agreement was initiated by Mr. Rucker and
that he was aware of the financial obligations imposed by it.
Mr. Cheney testified (Tr. 110) that the first agreement was
supplemented at the request of Mr. Rucker, who went to
the real estate office and offered to assume the chattel mortgage in order to facilitate performance of the contract. Mr.
Petersen testified that this second agreement was made out
in his office and the respondents were not present at the
time (Tr. 58) only Mr. Rucker was present and he was fully
informed as to the financial aspects of the deal (Tr. 60-61)
and he made no objection (Tr. 62, 140, 144).
Mr. Nielsen testified that he had nothing to do with
the preparation of the supplemental agreement (Tr. 157)
and the appellant testified regarding it as follows (Tr. 206..

207):
"Q. Now I wanted to asked this to satisfy my mind. You

went to Ogden on the 30th of March. It was you that
hunted up Mr. Peterson in his office?
A. I went to his office.
Q. Why did you go down there that day?
A. Well, I thought I was helping out the deal.
Q. That's my understanding.
A. I intended to trade if everything had been like they
said it was.
Q. And at that time he did - or that is, you decided on
a method of financing it as you had Mr. Petersen make
the supplemental agreement.
A. Yes.
Q. That's correct, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. And Mr. Peterson then wrote out what you would
4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

do?
A. Yes."
The appellent further stated (Tr. 209-210):
"Q. Now I have another notation here. You said to
Mr. Mason, "I considered the original agreement terminated. They said they couldn't get finance." When
did you consider the original agreement, Ex A, terminated?
A. Well, I don't know whether it was Mr. Peterson or
Cheney, that told me they couldn't get the finance,
they'd have to quit.
Q. When did you consider then that you'd have to quit?
A. When they told me.
Q. When was that?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Was that before your supple.mental agreement was
made up?
A. Before the second one was made up.
Q. Yes. So rather than have it terminated, you went
down to Ogden to try and work out something else to
keep it revived?
A. That's right.
Q. And that's when you worked out there terms under
Ex. B?"
Mrs. Rucker was also aware of the purpose of the supplemental agreement. She testified (Tr. 246):
"Q. And you knew that from the time you had signed
Ex. A that Mr. Nielsen was around trying to raise some
money to pay off this chattel mortgage as agreed in
Exhibit "A"?
A. Yes.
Q. And so on the 30th of March, as a new way of financing, you knew your husband had proposed this agreement here shown as Exhibit "lB", as a supple.mental
agreement?
A. Yes, I knew the conditions.
Q. Under that exhibit, why, you and your husband
agreed to pay this chattel mortage?
A. Yes, we did under the terms.
Q. And after you two had agreed and signed, you knew
that that was taken over to the Nielsens for their signature?
A. I guess so."
Thus the testimony clearly and indisputably shows that
the supplemental agreement was entirely Mr. Rucker's own
idea and that he did not consult with the Nielsens at all prior
5 provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to it$.. preparation and execution. '.By this agreement the
appellants, being fully cognizant of its terms, undertook to
assume· the responsibility for the chattel mortgage on the
Nielsen cattle. At the time this agreement was executed
the chattel mortage was on record at the County Recorder's
office in the Box Elder County Court House. Hannah HilIam, an employee of the County Recorder's Office testified
that the chattel mortgage signed by the respondents in
favor of the Bank of Utah was filed with the County Recorder of Box Elder County on December 26, 1956, (Tr .176)
and had been on record there ever since (Tr. 177).
Mr. Rucker testified that he knew of the chattel mortgage on the cattle (Tr. 181). In addition there is some testimony that he consulted with the County Recorder's records prior to the time the supplemental instrument was
executed (Tr. 200-201) and fully understood the terms of
the chattel mortgage, but, after a short recess during_ :which
he consulted with his counsel and Mrs. Rucker, he changed
this testimony (Tr. 219). However, throughout his testimony, Mr. Rucker indirectly admitted that there were no
misrepresentations by showing knowledge or constructive
knowledge prior to March 30th of all details of the financial
aspects of the agreement (Tr. 196-201).
Throughout the entire record there is consistent, uncontroverted and convincing testimony by all the parties
that they considered the agreement to be binding and that
it was the intent of all of them to trade their properties
according to its terms. Mr. Rucker specifically testified
"I intended to trade the motel, the home and apartment
house" (Tr. 35); and gave his opinion as to the fairness
of the trade as follows (Tr. 52):
''Q. Now, Mr. Rucker, if I understand you right then,
to sum this up, that this agreement together with the
supplemental agreement that was signed on the 30th
of March, 1957, if that agreement were carried out on
both sides as written, you would make this trade?
·A. If they was correct, yes, but they wasn't correct.
6 provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q. Well, we're here to see whether it's correct or not

through this court. You wouldn't turn down a transfer
or trade if it's exactly like the agreement?
A. I intended to trade if everything had been as said.
Reco.mmended. And it would have been a good, fair
trade."
As will be subsequently shown herein, the offers of
performance made by the respondents are as represented in
the agreement, but the appellants seek to avoid performance
under its terms because of frivolous excuses and objections
made after the institution of this action and which have no
sound basis in fact or in law.
That the appellants fully intend to make the trade in
accordance with the agreement is further evidenced by the
testimony of one of their tenants who stated that he had
been informed by the Ruckers that they were moving out.
This was toward the end of March, and the R uckers
said that they were moving the next Saturday
and that a .man from Harper Ward was going to
come in (Tr. 89-92). Moreover, the evidence and testimony as to their actions during this time corroborates the
oral testimony of this intent by revealing the preparations
made and contemplated by the appellants and the respondents in order that the contract might be performed as
anticipated. Appellants permitted an inventory to be
made of the items which they intended to trade. Mr. Rucker
testified that his wife gave the agent permission to count
the items of personal property which would be traded with
the motel. (Tr. 37). Mr. Rucker discussed with Mr. Nielsen
the supplies on hand at the dairy farm and he testified that
he told Mr. Nielsen he didn't want to fool with beet pulp,
and told Nielsen he could sell it (Tr. 206). In addition, both
parties made negotiations preparatory to carrying out the
agreement. Mr. Rucker, the appellant, took so.me of his
things over to the Nielsen property (Tr. 45). Mr. Cheney
testified that he saw the fence posts and other things which
Mr. Rucker had taken to the dairy farm (Tr. 104). On the
7
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other hand, the respondents also commenced preparations
for the exchange. They hired a truck and two men to help
them move and contacted the former owner of the motel
to employ him to assist them in taking care of it, (Tr. 152).
Any implication that the parties did not intend to make
the trade in accordance with the contract is clearly contradicted by the record, either by direct testimony or by other
facts and circumstances which are clearly shown. This
contradiction of Mr. Rucker's testimony (Tr. 188-189) ·to
the effect that he considered the original agreement terminated because of the inability of Mr. Nielsen to finance his
portion of the agreement is complete~y and convincingly
demonstrated by his and others' testimony as to his actions
and efforts to supply such financing by proposing and executing the supplemental agreement.
It is respondents' contention that Exhibits "A" and
"B" form the entire contract between the parties as to the
exchange of the properties and only the detail of making
up and executing the legal documents to carry out the agreement and the physical exchange of the properties on the
agreed date remained to be done, and the appellants admit
that at the time they fully intended to trade (R. 52). It
was further agreed verbally between the parties that an
exchange would take place on Saturday and Sunday the 6th
and 7th of April, 1957 (R. 153) and each of the parties
actively commenced to carry the exchange into being b~
the appellants delivering certain personal property to re-:spondents' place (R. 45) and the respondents arranging
for hired help and trucks with which to move the equipment
(R. 152). The details of preparing the final instruments
of title were left up to the joint agent of both parties.
Everything was agreeable up to the 5th day of April, 1957,
when the respondents went to the Rucker home and received
instructions on how to keep the books, and the listing of
renters (R. 155) and on the 6th of April Mr. Rucker was going to see how the cows were handled (R. 156). But about

s·
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the same time Mr. Rucker came back and picked up some
posts he had left (R. 156) and the famous telegram of April
6th was sent to Mr. Petersen in Ogden. It reads as follows:
"BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH, APRIL 6th 11:30 P.M.,
HAROLD S. PETERSEN
REALTORS OFFICE, 421 KEISEL A VENUE
OGDEN, UTAH
RE: RUCKER NIELSEN DEAL, TIME HAS RUN
OUT, NO FURTHER CONSIDERATION NECESSARY. WE GIVE NO FAVORS AND ASK NO
FAVORS.
GEORGE M. MASON." (Plaintiff's Ex. Y)
It must be noted that this telegram makes no charge
of failure of consideration or of performance or proffered
performance on the part of the respondents. (See Tr. 48-49).
A reading of it reveals no valid ground for rescission. Mr.
Petersen, the agent who received it, testified, "I didn't
know what the telegram meant. I couldn't understand it."
(Tr. 84).
Throughout the entire period the respondents have
been willing and able to do anything necessary to perform
their obligations under the agree.ment. Mr. Nielsen testified that they were ready and willing to move and exchange
their farm for the property of the appellants on the basis
set out in the agreement, but were barred from doing so
by the actions of the appellants, and it was necessary to
bring an action to seek the court to enforce the contract
according to its terms. (Tr. 157). Furthermore, papers
were prepared by the agents for the respondents' signatures
to carry out their share of the agreement, and if these
papers are not full and complete the plaintiffs are willing
to sign any paper that the court might direct in order to
perform under the contract according to its terms. (Tr.172).
Evidence and testimony of the appellants' actions and
attitudes on the other hand, reveals a complete refusal to
recognize and perform their obligations under the agreement. Transfer papers were prepared by the agents and
9
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presented for their signature, but they refused to sign (Tr.
50-51, 53, and 64). Although the agent stated that Mr.
Rucker should have his attorney look the papers over, and
if there was anything further which needed to be done by
the agent, the latter would comply with the attorney's directions (Tr. 83-84), no such directions were issued to the
agent, and there is no indication that the attorney attempted
to determine the sufficiency of the papers submitted and
direct that further instruments be prepared, or that those
received be corrected in any way. Numerous and various
excuses have been offered for the appellants' failure to
perform and most of them were not advanced until trial.
Most of the objections now raised to excuse the non-performance could have been cured without trial had the
appellants and their attorney raised them at the time the
performance was offered. The only evidence of the basis
for their failure to perform, other than the telegram
hereinbefore discussed, is the testimony of Mr. Cheney regarding a conversation he had with Mr. Rucker on the 7th
or 8th of April, (Tr. 105):
"He said the deal was all off and he said, 'We can't go
through with it because you've asked us to sign for the
personal property in the apartment house.' We didn't
ask him to sign the personal property. We asked him to
sign the fixtures. The fixtures are not the furniture."
As a consequence of the appellants' refusal to carry out
the terms of their contract, this action in specific performance was filed by the respondents and tried successfully
in the lower court.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I. THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT (PLAINTIFFS'
EXHIBIT A), AS SUPPLEMENTED BY THE INSTRUMENT DATED MARCH 30, 1957 (PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT
B) AND SIGNED BY ALL PARTIES HERETO, WAS NOT
A TENTATIVE AGREEMENT, BUT CONSTITUTES A
VALID, DEFINITE, COMPLETE AND CERTAIN CONTRACT, EXECUTORY IN NATURE, WIDCH IS BINDING
ON ALL THE PARTIES.
POINT II THE CHATIEL MORTGAGE WAS A MAT-

10
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TER OF PUBLIC RECORD AND THE APPELLANT HAD
ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF ITS
CONTENTS, AND ITS ASSUMPTION BY HIM WAS A
CREATURE OF HIS OWN MAKING.
POINT III. THE COURT, SITTING AS A COURT OF
EQUITY, MAY COMPEL SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF
THE AGREEMENT (PLAINTIFFS' EXHitBITS A & B),
AND THERE IS NO ADEQUATE REM..EDY AT LAW.
POINT IV. RESPONDENTS HEREIN HAVE MADE
EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT TO COl\1PLY STRICTLY
WITH THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT AND TO CARRY ITS PERFORMANCE.
POINT V. THE PURPORTED FAILURE ON THE PART
OF THE AGENT OF BOTH PARTIES TO PREPARE
CERTAIN INSTRUMENTS IN KEEPING WITH THE
ORIGINAL CONTRACT DOES NOT AFFECT THE OBLIGATION OF THE PARTIES THEREUNDER, NOR DID IT
INDUCE THE EXECUTION OF THE CONTRACT, AND
ERRORS COULD HAVE BEEN CORRECTED AT ANY
TIME TO COMPLY WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT,
IF APPELLANTS HAD ACTED IN GOOD FAITH.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT (PLAINTIFF'S EXIDBIT A) AS SUPPLEMENTED BY THE INSTRUMENT DATED MARCH 30,
1957,
(PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT B), and SIGNED BY ALL PARTIES
HERETO, WAS NOT A TENTATIVE AGREEMENT,
BUT CONSTITUTES A VALID, DEFINITE, COMPLETE
AND CERTAIN CONTRACT EXECUTORY IN NATURE,
WHICH IS BINDING ON ALL THE PARTIES.
In order to justify a decree for specific performance
it is first necessary to establish the existence of a valid contract. American Jurisprudence, 1Volume 49, Section 15,
Page 24, states the general rule in the following language:
"While it is universally recognized that equitable relief
by way of specific performance does not follow as a
matter of course by establishing the existence and validity of the contract the performance of which is
sought, the existence of a valid contract is essential,
and .many of the cases in which the jurisdiction of a
court of equity, or of a court exercising equity powers,
is invoked to obtain a specific enforcement of a contract do not turn so much upon rules governing the
exercise of those equitable power as they do upon the
underlying and fundamental questions as to the exist11
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ence or nonexistence of a legal contract. In order for
equity to decree specific performance, it is necessary
that there be in existence and in effect a contract valid
at law and binding upon the party against whom
performance is sought for specific performance is
never applicable where there is no obligation to perform ... "
Corpus Juris Secondum sets out the necessary ingredients to the establishment of a valid contract as (1) parties
competent to contract, (2) subject matter, (3) a legal consideration, (4) mutuality of agreement and (5) mutuality
of consideration. (17C.J.S.310) By applying this test it
becomes apparent that all of the necessary ingredients
are present in the agreement in the instant
case. All parties to the agreement were competent, the
properties to be exchanged (subject matter) are described
with reasonable certainty, the mutual promises to exchange
them constitutes adequate consideration, and there is mutuality as to both agreement and consideration.
In this instance we are dealing with one agreement entered into between the parties for the exchange of their
respective properties. This is the Earnest Money Receipt
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit A). This agreement was subsequently supplemented by the instrument dated March 30, 1957
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit B), but essentially the two together
constitute the one contract with which we are concerned.
It must be remembered that all of the witnesses, including
both of the defendants, testified specifically that at the
time they executed this contract it was their intention to
trade their properties. Furthermore a readng of the instrument itself reveals that one purpose and intent solely
There is nothing in its language from which it can be implied that this was merely an agreement to make and execute another future agreement of exchange. The parties
contemplated the immediate exchange of their realty and
expressed this purpose in writing, and signed the instrument to the effect on March 14, 1957, setting on or before
April 5, 1957, as the date of the physical exchange of their

12
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properties. Although several separate documents were received in evidence there is only one contract consisting of
plaintiffs' exhibit A, as supplemented by plaintiff's exhibit
B which covers the entire transaction. All the other documents merely constitute a part of the plaintiffs' tendered
performance, and were executed for the purpose of carrying
out the intent of the parties as expressed in the original
contract. Contrary to defendants' contention, this contract
was not tentative, but upon its signing and delivery it constituted a definite, certaln and complete agreement between the parties to exchange their properties. It was a
complete contract, executory in nature, which necessarily
contemplated certain further acts to be performed and instruments to be signed in order to effectuate completion
of the performance of its terms.
It is clear that the parties did not contemplate the execution of any other instrument to set out their contract, although the performance of the agreement did call for the
execution of other documents in order to effect a transfer
of title to the properties. In this connection the California
case of Mann vs. Mueller, 295 P. 2d 42, 140 C. A. 2d 481, is
directly in point. The Court there held:
"Where the parties, as in the instant action, have
agreed in writing upon the essential terms of their
contract (for the exchange of realty), even though
several more formal instruments are to be prepared
and signed later, the written agremeent which they
have already signed is a binding contract. When one
party refuses to execute the more for.mal instruments
intended, the other party has a right to rely upon the
contract already expressed in writing. ·Vavina v.
Smith, 25 Cal. 2d 501, 504, 154 P. 2d 681."
Concededly, the contract anticipated subsequent actions
on the part of the parties to carry out the terms of this
contract, but these acts were to be the performance agreed
to by the parties in the original contract. They contemplated that mortgages, bills of sale, deeds and other instruments would have to be signed and executed pursuant to
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the original contract, but these documents were not to be
considered the major agreement, they were minor and subsidiary accessories to the primary contract and none of
them represents the complete whole of the agreement.
This is represented only by the original primary agreement.
It is the only instrument, either made or contemplated,
which includes in definite terms the intent of the parties
to exchange their properties and the terms upon which such
an exchange was to be made. This instrument, by its nature, anticipated performance of future acts by both parties.
It was therefore, not a tentative agreement as claimed by
the appellants, but was a complete executory contract. "An
executory contract is one in which a party binds himself to
do or not to do a particular thing in the future. An executory contract conveys a chose in action; an executed contract, a chose in possession." (17 C.J.S. 326; Lewis v. Lambros, Montana, 194 Pac. 152).
Appellants quote 81 Corpus Juris Secondum Sec. 33,
page 488, which states:
"Except where uncertainty and ambiguity has been removed or cured by the parties a court of equity will not
decree specific performance of a contract for the sale,
exchange or conveyance of land, or an interest therein,
unless the contract designates or describes the land
with definiteness and certainty or furnishes or refers
to means or data by which it can be identified and located with certainty by the aid of admissable extrinstic
evidence, such as public records, maps or other documents..... "
This is certainly a case where the parties themselves
have cured any uncertainty about the property by viewing
it, by looking at it, by inspecting, by counting the livestock,
machinery and equipment. That there is nothing in the
record that could be construed as evidence to the effect
that neither of the parties knew what the other was toreceive, in exchange for the others' property, after Exhibits
A and B had been executed. But, more important than
that, the quotation relied upon by the appellants is taken
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from context and does not state the applicable rule in its
entirety. The paragraph immediately preceding that quoted in appellants' brief and the first and primary rule stated
in Section 33 of the quoted text is as follows:
"Before a contract will be specifically enforced it must
be reasonably definite and certain as to its subject matter; the subject matter must be, and it is sufficient
if it is, described so that it may be aided and made
definite by such extrinsic evidence as is admissable for
such purpose."
One of the cases cited in the footnote to this section is
directly in point. In the case of Thompson v. Walsh, 172
P.2d 745, (California) the court stated:
" . . . . The escrow holder was the agent of the plaintiffs as well as of the defendants for the consummation
of the sale and was authorized to receive from defendants an acceptance of plaintiffs' offer. It was not necessary that plaintiffs' instructions, D, also, should
contain a description of the personal property, nor was
it necessary that defendants' acceptance contain such
description. Plaintiffs' offer was as much a part of
the agreement as were the escrow instructions, and
could be looked to for a description of the property
which was to be the subject of the bill of sale and the
inventory ...."
The Utah Supreme Court in Continental Bank & Trust
Co. vs. Bybee, 306 P.2d 773, 6 Utah 2d 98, held that the
intent of the parties to contract should be ascertained
first from the four corners of the instrument itself, second
from other contemporaneous writings concerning the same
subject matter, and third from extrinsic parol evidence of
the intentions. It has also been held that the mutual intention of the parties as exhibited by their language, acts
and conduct governs in construing a contract. Crocker v.
McFadden, (Calif.) 307 P2d. 429. In the instant case, all
of the witnesses, including the two appellants, testified
that at the time the agreement was signed it was their
intention to trade their properties. In the light of these
declarations, the only possible construction which can be
placed upon the instrument is that it was a complete and
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final agreement to carry out that intent. The evidence of
the parties' activities during and immediately after the contract was signed also supports this construction.
In the instant case the contract specifically provides
that the respondents were to trade "The dairy farm owned
by Glen F. Nielsen and wife AltaR. Nielsen, together with
all stock and equipment as listed on listing card, located at
three miles north of Brigham City, Utah". Looking to the
listing card, defendants' exhibit X, the acreage of the dairy
farm is stated to be 110 acres and the buildings, cattle and
other ite.ms are described. Thus, the contract itself specifically includes and refers to another document which, when
read together with the contract, renders its meaning clear
and certain as to the property contemplated by the parties
and therefore the rule in the above quoted case is doubly
applicable.
The minor errors made by the parties' mutual agent in
tendering performance of the contract do not affect the
basic agreement of the parties, about which there is no confusion. These errors will be discussed in a subsequent portion of this brief.
POINT II. THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE WAS A MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD AND THE APPELLANT HAD
ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF ITS
CONTENTS, AND ITS ASSUMPTION BY HIM WAS A
CREATURE OF HIS OWN MAKING.
The evidence at the trial reveals that subsequent to the
signing of the original agreement the appellant, Mr. Rucker,
approached the real estate agent and enlisted his aid in expediting the performance of the agreement according to its
terms. Mr. Rucker made a trip to Ogden to the agent's office for this purpose. Pursuant to Mr. Rucker's desire and
in his presence and at that time unbeknown to the respondents, the agent prepared the so-called supplemental agreement. The appellants, fully cognizant of its terms, signed
this agreement and thereby undertook to assume the responsibility for the chattel mortgage on the Nielson cattle. At
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the time the appellants executed this instrument the chattel mortgage was on record at the Box Elder County Court
House and the officers of the bank which held this mortgage were readily available for consultation and information. In addition, there is some testimony in the record that
Mr. Rucker consulted the records at the Court House prior
to the time the March 30th instrument was executed, but
this was later denied by him, after a short recess during the
trial (Tr. 207, 216, 219). The testimony shows that this
supplemental agreement was entirely Mr. Rucker's own
idea and that he did not consult with the Nielson's at all
prior to its preparation and execution. Also, it .must be
remembered that these parties are mature individuals, who
had at least a basic knowledge concerning transactions in
real estate having dealt in such matters previously and they
should have understood the effect of their signatures when
freely and voluntarily placed upon written instruments.
In these circumstances, the conclusion is inescapable that
Mr. Rucker knew or reasonably should have known the extent to which he would be bound by the agreement he signed.
However, conceding for purposes of argument only,
that there was a misunderstanding between the parties as
to the terms of the chattel mortgage which the appellants
subsequently agreed to assume, respondents should not be
held accountable for the appellants' misunderstanding.
Certain admitted facts .must be remembered in this connection. First: The respondents voluntarily and readily revealed that the title to the cattle was encumbered by a chattel mortgage. Second: The assumption of the chattel
mortgage by the appellants was entirely voluntary and came
about as a result of action initiated solely by Mr. Rucker.
Third: The mortgage was on record at the Box Elder
County Court House and had been a matter of record since
December 26, 1956, over three months prior to the time the
defendants agreed to assume it. Fourth: The appellants
had conferred with the officers of the Bank of Utah, the
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holder of the chattel mortgage, prior to the time they signed the subsidiary agree.ment in which they undertook to
assume this obligation. Thus, no misrepresentations were,
or could have been, made to them. The due date of the
chattel mortgage and its terms were fully revealed. The
opportunity to acquaint themselves with these terms was
readily accessible to the appellants. Ordinary prudence
and caution would dictate that they use reasonable diligence to discover the provisions of the mortgage, which
were on record for all the world to see, prior to the time they
2.greed to assume it. Their failure, if any, to acquire actual
knowledge of its terms should not be charged against the
respondents who had openly, voluntarily and readily imparted the information that their title to the cattle was encumbered. It is unnecessary that actual knowledge of the
mortgage terms on the part of the appellants be shown.
Notice of the mortgage should be sufficient. At least, it is
obvious that circumstances were known to the appellants
which should have stimulated them to inquiry, when the
means of such inquiry were so readily accessible. It is conceded that notice and knowledge are not, in law, always
synonymous. However, proof of certain circumstances is
generally sufficient to warrant a presumption that a person
has knowledge, or the means of access to the needed information, and this is the equivalent of actual knowledge.
The presence of such circumstances is apparent in this case
and respondents contend that they are sufficient to justify
a finding of knowledge on the part of the appellants. At
least, in the face of all these facts and circumstances, appellants allegations of any .misrepresentation on the part of
the respondents, or misunderstanding on the part of themselves, can not be supported.
POINT III. THE COURT, SITTING AS A COURT OF
EQUIY, MAY COMPEL SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF
THE AGREEMENTS (PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBITS A & B)
AND THERE IS NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW.
It is well recognized that, as a part of the appropriate
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and acknowledged jurisdiction of a court of equity, specific
performance of a contract to convey real property has been
enforced from the earliest decisions, although the party may
have, in most cases, another remedy by an action at law
upon the agreement. Cummings vs. Nielsen, 42 Utah 157,
129 Pac. 619. When either party to a contract for the sale
of land has failed in his obligation, the other is entitled to
the alternative remedy of specific performance in equity,
or damage at law. Thompson, Real Property Volume 8,
Section 4630. Inasmuch as every suit for specific performance must necessarily be determined largely on its own special facts, the rules governing the case must be applied with
more or less flexibility.
Respondents are aware that certainty and completeness
of the contract are prerequisites of an action for a decree of
specific performance. See Thompson, supra, Section 4637.
In this case the instrument signed by the parties clearly expresses their intent and decision to trade their properties,
and the descriptions of such properties are sufficiently clear.
The terms upon which the exchange was to be made are
expressed, and a definite date for possession was agreed
upon, and the contract was certain as to its terms. By its
execution the parties clearly and definitely expressed their
intent to exchange their respective realty, and to later work
out such details, perform such acts, and sign such further
instruments as would be necessary to fully effectuate the
exchange in accordance with their original expressed intent.
The general rule states that it is not essential that the
contract be specific in all its terms, and in this instance the
nature of the transaction between the parties necessarily
required that subsequent documents such as assignments of
contracts and escrow agreements, warranty deeds, bills of
sale, mortgages and promissory notes be executed by the
parties in order to carry out the agreed intent and terms as
set out in the primary contract. The failure of the primary contract to recite all of the specific terms, details and
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conditions of each of the contemplated minor documents
does not affect its own validity.
While it is true that the language used in the contract
is not as apt as it might have been, its meaning is reasonably clear and was well understood by the parties to the
agreement. In this connection a leading Utah case on the
subject of specific performance is pertinent. In Cummings
vs. Nielsen, supra, decided by the Supreme Court in 1913
the lower court had heard plaintiffs' evidence in an action
for specific performance of a contract and had granted a
nonsuit and entered a judgment dismissing the action. On
appeal the Supreme Court reversed, and in doing so laid
down certain rules and principles governing such actions.
The Court stated:
"In determining the meaning that should be given to
the language used in an agreement in order to ascertain
the intention of the parties, all words or terms used
must be given their ordinary and usual effect, when
considered in the light of the subject matter and the
nature ·of the agreement.....
" .... It is a cardinal rule of construction that that
which is implied is always as much a part of any writing as that which is expressed.
"It is elementary that in equity that is certain which
can be made certain."
With the foregiing principles in mind a thorough examination of the contract in the present cast leads us to but one
conclusion: That a valid, complete and certain contract to
exchange their properties was entered into between the parties, and further, that the lower court's action in decreeing
specific performance was proper.
Nor can there be any doubt that there is sufficient
consideration to support the contract. Thompson, supra,
Section 4639, states:
"A contract to be specifically enforced must be supported by a valuable consideration, but the mutual promises of each party, as in a contract to exchange real estate, may be sufficient consideration to support an action for specific performance."
Here, the parties clearly intended to exchange their
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properties. Each of them, without any undue influence,
voluntarily signed the contract of which specific performance is now sought. Subsequent disagreements, or misunderstandings, if any, as to the minor details which had to
be worked out in subsequent minor instruments in order to
effect complete performance of the contract should not be
allowed to affect retroactively the promises clearly pronounced in the primary understanding which existed between the parties, and which had previously been reduced to
writing and signed and delivered by them. The contract is
complete and valid and constitutes a clear statement of the
desire and decision of th~ parties to exchange their respective properties, each valued at $95,000.00.
The .modern trend in suits for specific performance
evidences a tendency on the part of courts to accept established rules of equity as binding upon them, even though
the language used in many of the cases expresses their decisions in such terms that would lead one to presume that
it was a discretionary action. American Jurisprudence
Volume 49, Seeton 9, Page 17, expresses this modern view
in the following language:
"Terms indicating a discretion on the part of the court
in decreeing specific performance were originally used
apparently to distinguish equitable relief from the relief obtainable in an action at law for breach of con. tract, but the grounds upon which the courts were
' moved to grant relief by way of specific performance
have gradually crystallized into rules binding upon the
courts and controlling their discretion, until at the
present time these rules and principles have become so
well settled as to .make the use of the term 'discretion'
with regard to the granting of a decree of specific performance often somewhat misleading. This is true
even when the terms 'sound' and 'judicial' discretion
are used to indicate a discretion controlled by or subject to equitable rules granting or refusing relief in
actions for specific performance of contracts. As has
been said, the remedy of specific performance is governed by the same general rules which control the administration of other equitable remedies. As a general rule it .may be said that when the party seeking
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specific performance of a contract establishes the existence of a valid binding contract which is definite and
certain in its terms and contains the requisite of mutuality of obligation and is one which is free from unfairness, fraud, or overreaching, and enforceable without injustice upon the party against whom enforcement
is sought, the court will, when the remedy at law for
the breach of such contract is inadequate, and the enforcement of specific performance will not be inequitable, oppressive, or unconscionable, or result in undue
hardship, grant a decree of specific performance as a
matter of course or right. Rights of the plaintiff to
such relief where he makes a case coming within these
equitable rules, or the right of the defendant to have
the plaintiff remitted to his action at law if his case is
not brought within these equitable rules, is not dependent upon any exercise of discretionary power on the
part of the court in the literal sense of the term."
Accordingly, since the contract under consideration
herein reasonably meets all the conditions of a valid contract, and clearly expresses the intent of the parties, was
not obtained through fraud, and no hardship would be imposed since its performance would merely accomplish what
was intended by both parties, the court, by applying the
settled principles governing suits for specific performance
should exercise its powers of equity and grant the relief
sought by the respondents.
In this instance, little argument to the effect that there
is no adequate remedy it law, is necessary. The contract
involves the exchange of certain pieces of real property,
and where that type of property is involved courts, almost
universally, consider that money damages will not compensate for the breach. 1\merican Jurisprudence, Volume 49,
page 107 states the rule in the followng language (Sec. 92) :
"The subject matter most commonly involved in actions
for specific performance is that of contracts for the sale
of land or which otherwise involve interest in real estate. The reason for this lies not so much in any tendency of equity to distinguish between kinds of property as in the fact that the remedy at law is less likely
to be adequate in the case of land than in the case of
other property, for if the proper elements of jurisdiction are present, equity impartially grants specific perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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formance of .any contract, regardless of whether it involves real or personal property. The most important
aspect of land, in so far as equity jurisdiction for specific performance is concerned, is that no piece of land
has its counterpart anywhere else, and is impossible
of duplication by the expenditure of any amount of
money.
"The courts assume, in almost every case in which ac~
tion is brought to enforce specific performance of aco1;1tract for the sale of land or an interest therein, that
money damages do not constitute an adequate remedy
for the breach of such a contract, and take jurisdiction
without the necessity of an actual showing that this is
the case..... "
Applying these principles to the instant case, it is the
contention of the plaintiffs that the contract herein, being
one involving real property, is a proper instrument upon
which a court of equity should exercise its powers and grant
specific performance, and that in such a case there is no
necessity to show affirmatively that an action for damages.
at law would be inadequate.
POINT IV. RESPONDENTS HEREIN HAVE MADE:
EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT TO COMPLY STRICTLY
WITH THE TERMS OF 'rHE CONT'RACT AND TO CARRY OUT ITS PERFORMANCE.
There can be no serious question about the efforts
which respondents have made to perform their obligations
under the contract. They executed all the documents presented to the.m by the agents, to carry out their portion of
the contract and left these papers with the Real Estate Exchange in Ogden, Utah, for delivery to the appellants.
They also delivered the abstract of title to the dairy farm·
to the agent in Ogden, where it was available for the ap-.
pellants' examination. At all times they have stood in.
readiness to effect a physical exchange of the possession of
the properties. Their institution of this suit for specific
performance of the contract is but further evidence of their
willingness and desire to conform to its terms. Any failure to complete the performance of the contract has been
due solely to the actions of the appellants.
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The respondents have at all times been ready and willing to perform the obligations assumed by them when they
entered into the contract with the appellants. They still
remain ready and willing to perform in accordance with the
ter.ms of the decree of the lower court, and so stated in open
court (Tr. 158-159):
"Q. Are you willing to execute
any instrument
that might be necessary in the opinion of a court of
equity to complete the transfer according to the terms
of the agreement entered into?
A: Yes.
Q: And you would like the same paper entered in your
behalf?
A: Yes."
POINT V. THE PURPORTED FAILURE ON THE PART
OF THE AGENT OF BOTH PARTIES TO PREPARE CERTAIN INSTRUMENTS IN KEEPING WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRAC'l1 DOES NOT AFFECT THE OBLIGATION
OF THE PARTIES THEREUNDER, NOR DID IT INDUCE
THE EXECUTION OF THE CONTRACT, AND ERRORS
COULD HAVE BEEN CORRECTED AT ANY TIME TO
COMPLY WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT, IF APPELLANTS HAD ACTED IN GOOD FAITH.
Apellants point to a disparity between the total acreage of the dairy farm as anticipated in the contract and that
in the performance tendered by the respondents through
their mutual agent. Because of this they assert that their
refusal to live up to their obligations under the contract
is justified. This is a minor matter relating to one of the
details of performance of the valid contract, and does not
affect its original validity nor excuse non-performance on
the part of the appellants. Respondents have continually
maintained and testified that they are ready, willing and
able to perform whatever acts are necessary to complete
their performance of the contract. Any discrepancies or
omissions in their tendered perfomance could and would
have been corrected by the mutual agent had apellants dealt
with them in good faith. In this connection it should also
be remembered that the parties viewed the premises and
properties thereon, and there was a complete understanding
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and agreement as to the amount, extent and type of realty
and personal property intended to be transferred. Any correction necessay to bring performance within the intent
and meaning of the contract could have been easily remedied. It must be noted that the respondents were prohibited from carrying out their portion of the agreement in a
proper manner by the appellants' attempted repudiation
and failure to live up to their obligations. Had appellants
notified their own agent of this minor inadvertant error,
the papers could have been readily corrected.
Appellants also seek to avoid the obligations imposed
upon them under the contract by claiming that their nonperformance is excused because the deed from the respondents to the appellants reserves one-half >Of all oil, gas and
mineral rights (plaintiffs' exhibit F.) An immediate answer to this contention is that the appellants failed t'O include such an issue in their pleadings. Moreover, appellants' deed to the respondents (plaintiffs' exhibits M and
N) included similar provisions. But, most important, and
this considerati>Dn affects the reservation of these rights
and other matter previously discussed, appellants made no
objection to these matters at the time the performance was
tendered or in ~ reasonable time thereafter, nor did they
at any time seek to have the agent revise or correct any of
the instruments or tell anyone concerned the nature of. the
deficiencies or discrepancies upon which they now base their
objections. It is clear that the appellants did not base their
attempted rescission of the contract upon any of the
grounds now advanced since no one was informed of their
objections. They should not be allowed to assert these
matters after trial has commenced.
Pertinent to this issue is the case of McAdam v. Leak
(Kansas) 208 Pac. 569, in which the court said:
"It is contended that the minds of the parties did not
meet upon all the essential matters of the contract because nothing had been said as to when and where the
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purchase price was to be paid. In that situation the
defendant could have insisted upon receiving it at her
residence in exchange for the deed as soon as a reasonable time had elapsed fo:r an examination of the abstract. She did not break off the deal, however, because of any question of time or place of payment or of
delivery of the abstract or deed, but upon the ground
that the price was too low."
And in Le Marine! v. ;Bach, 196 Pac. 22, the supreme
court of Washington upheld a decree of specific performance of a contract for the exchange of property. The
court said:
"The tender of performance made on the part of respondents included an assignment of the contract which
they held from one Taylor and consent on Taylor's part
to the assignment as well as tender of the $6000 which
respondents were to pay the appellants. The appellants did not refuse to perform because the contract
tendered was not such as they thought they were entitled to, but they based their claim in the first instance upon the alleged fact that the contract had
been induced by fraud. If the court should be of the
view that the contract to be tendered was different
from that offered by the respondents, it would not
follow that the action would absolutely fail for this
reason, because, this being an equity action, the parties would undoubtedly be given the privilege of tendering such a contract as the court considered they were
under obligation to do."
Respondents are of the opinion that the appellants are
now confusng "completed contract" with "completed performance of the contract." These objections relate to performance, and not to any fatal defects in the contract itself. Appellants have failed to allege, or prove, what essential elements of a valid contract have been omitted from
the agreement signed by the parties, but both appellants
testified as to their intent. The parties here adapted a
printed from to their use. This form is designated as an
Earnest Money Receipt and similar instruments have prevously been considered by the Utah Supreme Court and
their validity upheld. In Ney v. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217,
299 P2d 1114, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court
26
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and upheld the validity of an earnest money receipt, thereby decreeing payment of a brokers commission according to
the terms of the contract. See also Continental Bank &
Trust Company v. Stewart, 291 P.2d 890, 4 Utah 2d 228,
and Gaddis Investment Company v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43,
278 Pd2 284.
As a final argument against the objections made torespondents' tender of performance as advanced by appellants, it should be noted that all necessary deeds and bills
of sale could have been reformed to comply with the contract
and the intent of the parties. See Nordfors v. Knight, 90
Utah 114, 60 P2d 1115; Naisbitt v. Hodges, 6 Utah 2d 116
307 P2d 620, and cases cited therein.
CROSS APPEAL
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The contract (exhibit A) provided for the payment of
reasonable attorney's fees to enforce the same. The only
evidence covering reasonable attorneys fees was $3000.00
to $3500.00.
STATMENT OF POINTS:
POINT I: THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT THE PLAINTIFFS ATTORNEYS FEES FOR
THE USE AND BENEFIT OF THEIR ATI'ORNEYS IN
THE SUM OF $3500.00 PURSUANT TO THE TESTIMONY
PRODUCED AT SAID HEARING, AS BEING THE REASONABLE SUM FOR ATTORNEYS FEES FOR LITIGATING A TRANSACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
OF A CONTRACT DECLARED BY THE PARTIES TO
INVOLVE PROPERTIES OF A VALUE OF $95,000.00 FOR
EACH OF SAID PROPERTIES.
POINT II: THAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS THE
RIGHT TO ASSESS SUCH SUM AS AND FOR ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL, AS IS !EQUITABLE THE
CONTRACT RELIED UPON AND SIGNED BY 'I'HE
PARTIES PROVIDED FOR A REASONABLE ATTOR~
NEYS FEE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENFORCING SAID
CONTRACT.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT THE PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEYS FEES FOR
THE USE AND BENEFIT OF THEIR ATTORNEYS IN
THE SUM OF $3500.00 PURSUANT TO THE TESTIMONY
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PRODUCED AT SAID HEARING, AS BEING THE REASONABLE SUM FOR ATTORNEYS FEES FOR LITIGATING A TRANSACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
OF A CONTRACT DECLARED BY THE PARTIES TO
INVOLVE PROPERTIES OF A VALUE OF $95,000.00
FOR EACH OF SAID PROPERTIES.
That the amount of attorneys fees awarded by the
court below is clearly insufficient is established by the record. The only evidence regarding such fees is the testimony of Mr. 0. Dee Lund who was qualified as an expert
witness on this subject. After reviewing the nature of the
case and the work involved in interviewing witnesses, examining documents, and researching legal authorities, he testified that a reasonable attorneys fee in a case such as this
would be between $3000.00 and $3500.00 (Tr. 96-98).
In addition to this uncontroverted testimony as to attorneys fees, the inadequacy of the fees allowed by the court
is further demonstrated when compared with the real estate
broker's commission. This was a transaction involving the
trade of two properties, each of a value of $95,000.00. On
exchange of the properties each of the parties had agreed
to pay the real estate agent five (5) per cent to perfect the
exchange.
Even the attorney for the defense l\ir. Mason agreed
that the amount of $3500.00 was reasonable for the legal
services performed. He stated (Tr. 435):
"Mr. Mason: Well we're still on these findings of fact.
On the basis of the evidence, we take great issue with
the provisions of paragraph nine and ten, and we take
issue with paragraph eleven.
Mr. Mann: You mean you want to pay us more attorney's fees?
Mr. Mason: Mr. Mann, if you're entitled to any, I wish
the court would have given you the whole $3500.00
Don't put that in the record.
The Court: It's in there.
Mr. Mann: Thanks George. That will help on appeal.
Mr. Mason: That's all right. That's all right.
The contract in this case provides:
"We do hereby agree to carry out and fulfill the terms
and conditions specified above, and, ... (etc.,) If either
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party fails so to do, he agrees to pay all expenses of
enforcing this agreement, or of any right, arising out
of the breach thereof, including a reasonable attorney's
fee."
We, as members of the Bar, feel that our services
are just as important as any real estate agent's services.
If a real estate agent could act for both parties and draw
five (5) per cent commission on $95,000.00 for each, we
certainly feel that an attorney going to court to enforce that
agreement would at least be entitled to $3500.00, as compared with $9500.00 for a real estate agent's services. We
feel that the $600.00 allowed by the court was almost an
insult to the ability of a lawyer. It might have had some
effect to stop an appeal, but that consideration should not be
involved in the assessment of a fair and reasonable fee.
We believe that the Supreme Court should direct that the
attorneys fees be in keeping with the only testimony presented to the Court: to-wit, $3500.00.
THAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS THE
POINT II:
RIGHT TO ASSESS SUCH SUM AS AND FOR ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL, AS IS EQUITABLE, THE
CONTRACT RELIED UPON AND SIGNED BY THE PARTIES PROVIDED FOR A REASONABLE ATTORNEYS
FEE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENFORCING SAID CONTRACT.
If the respondents are entitled to prevail on this appeal
to the Supreme Court, then the Supreme Court should fix
reasonable attorneys fees for defending this matter before
this Court on appeal. The amount thereof should rest in
the sound discretion of the Supreme Court, as no evidence
at this stage can be offered.
We earnestly request that if the respondents prevail
on their theory of the case that they also have fixed by this
Court the reasonable value of their s-ervices on appeal, and
that the District Court be directed to have it included as
part of its judgment.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion the respondents contend:
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1. That the original agreement ( exhrbit A) in connection with the supplemental agreement (exhibit B) is the
complete contract between the parties; is executory in nature; was not a mere tentative agreement, but constituted a
definite, certain, and complete expression of the intent of
the parties to exchange their properties and clearly reflects
the basic transaction contemplated by them.
2. That the parties involved are local parties, have
passed each other's propery over periods of years; are mature individuals with a background of trading experience
and knew what they were doing; took a great deal of time
to investigate each and every angle of the transatction. It
was not a rna tter of trading two properties of $95,000.00
each, without knowing every detail involved and upon the
execution and delivery of the original contract and supplemental contract (Exhibits A & B) the parties were bound
by its terms and since it deals with the exchange of specific
parcels of real property it is a proper instrument upon which
the court may exercise its equitable powers and grant specific performance, there being no adequate remedy at law.
3. That the respondents have done everything reasonably possible to perform their obligation under the eontract.
4. That the instruments required to complete the
transaction and place each of the parties into the possession of said properties, can be made up and executed by
each under the direction of the court.
5. That the contract provides for the payment of attorneys fees for enforcing the same and respondents are
entitled to a reasonable attorneys fee to-wit: The sum of
$3500.00 for the hearing in the District Court, and for reasonable attorneys fees to be fixed by the Supreme Court
upon defending this matter on appeal.

Respectfully submitted,
Walter G. Mann
Attorney for respondents
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